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QBism in the New Scientist
N. David Mermin
Laboratory of Atomic and Solid State Physics
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853
I correct a misrepresentation of QBism as antirealist.
On 10 May 2014 the New Scientist published an article that repeated
many naive misunderstandings of QBism. Since several of these misrep-
resentations are attributed to me, I submitted the following letter to the
editor:
I am delighted that you take the QBist understanding of science
seriously enough to feature it on your cover (State of Mind, 32-35, 10
May 2014). But the headline on the cover, the title of the article, and
several statements within it all overemphasize the subjectivity of the
scientist almost as much as conventional physics underemphasizes it
by ignoring it entirely. QBism strives to balance the subjective and
the objective.
For example your article attributes to QBism the view that “Mea-
surements do not cause things to happen in the real world, whatever
that is: they cause things to happen in our heads.” The actual QBist
position is that a measurement is any action a particular person (Al-
ice) takes on her external world, and the outcome of the measure-
ment is the experience this world induces back in Alice through its
response to her action. This differs from your formulation in several
ways:
Just as important as the action of the scientist on the world is
the response of the world to that action. Alice does not doubt the
existence of this world. What happens only in Alice’s head is what
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quantum theory calls the “outcome” of the measurement. Other
consequences of Alice’s action, though not as immediately accessible
to her as its outcome, are part of her external world and potentially
accessible to others, through their own actions. Alice, like all users
of the quantum theory, has her own private subjective experience,
but she can attempt to describe this to others through the imperfect
medium of language; this helps to account for the common features
of the different external worlds that each of us individually infers
from our own private experience.
It is, of course, hard to convey all this in three pages, a few
headlines, and a very short letter to the editor. It has, after all,
escaped the awareness of almost all physicists for nearly 90 years.
For a more nuanced view of QBism I recommend the paper cited in
your article, posted as arXiv:1311.5253.
I promptly received an email pointing out that letters should not exceed
250 words, and that “Our deadlines do not leave time to consult you on the
editing of letters. We’re quite good at saying what you meant, though.”
I immediately withdrew the above letter and resubmitted an abbreviated
text:
I am delighted that you take the QBist understanding of science
seriously (State of Mind, 32-35, 10 May 2014). But you overempha-
size the subjectivity of the scientist as badly as conventional physics
ignores it.
You attribute to QBism the view that “Measurements do not
cause things to happen in the real world, whatever that is: they cause
things to happen in our heads.” Actually QBists take a measurement
as any action anybody (Alice) takes on the world, and the outcome
of the measurement is the experience the world induces back in Alice
through its response to her action.
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Just as important as the action of Alice on the world is the re-
sponse of the world to her action. Alice does not doubt the existence
of the world. What happens only in Alice’s head is the “outcome”
of the measurement. Other consequences of Alice’s action, though
not as accessible to her as its outcome, belong to the world and
are accessible to others, through their own actions. Alice has her
private subjective experience, but can attempt to describe this to
others with language; this helps to account for the common features
of the different external worlds that each of us infers from our private
experience.
It is hard to convey all this in three pages, a few headlines, and a
very short letter to the editor. It has, after all, escaped the awareness
of almost all physicists for nearly 90 years
On 7 June 2014 the New Scientist (p. 30) published a letter drawn from
both of my versions. The letter they published differs from both of mine in
two important ways:
1. The phrase “whatever that is” is no longer in my quotation from the
article, though it is there in both versions of my letter.
2. The first three sentences of my next to last paragraph, which are quite
similar in both versions, are gone. (My second version of that paragraph is
at the top of this page.)
The first omission — of the New Scientist’s own words — diminishes
the degree to which their article misrepresents QBism as antirealist. The
second omission — from both my versions — eliminates the heart of my
explanation of QBist realism. Their combined effect is to turn my correction
of the New Scientist’s gross misrepresentation of realism in QBism into what
sounds like a pedantic quibble.
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